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Dimensions of Epistemology and the Case 
for Africa’s Indigenous Ways of Knowing 
Amaechi Udefi* 
Abstract 
African philosophical practice has taken a new turn since 
it survived the large scale problems and debates which 
characterized its early beginnings in an African 
environment and intellectual community. The 
metaphilosophical issues then concerned about its status, 
relevance and methodology appropriate or usable for 
doing it. Although the issues that troubled African 
philosophers then may have subsided, yet some of them 
have and are still expressing reservations on the 
possibility of having Africa‟s indigenous ways of 
knowing, just as they deny the possibility of „African 
physics‟ or „African arithmetic‟. Paulin Hountondji, a 
leading African philosopher, is reputed for denying 
African traditional thought as philosophy, which he 
prefers to type as ethnophilosophy, simply because it 
thrives on orality and other ethnographical materials like 
proverbs, parables, folklores, fables, songs etc. For him, 
the piece, at best can qualify as ethnographical or 
anthropological monographs as opposed to philosophical 
work which relies on written texts  and documentation on 
the basis of which “theoretical knowledge and significant 
intellectual exchange and innovation can” be achieved in 
Africa. Hountondji‟s position is, to say the least, 
exclusionist, since it denies and debars African modes of 
thought and heritage a position in the on-going 
philosophical conversation or discourse. 
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The paper shares Hountondji‟s vision of adoption of an 
attitude of critical, scientific and skeptical orientation in 
African societies. However, it rejects the views of 
Hountondji and other scholars who deny African 
intellectual and cognitive systems and argues that their 
position rests on one sided conception or dimension of 
epistemology. The other intention of the paper is to show 
that philosophical practice is as old as the history of 
mankind in Africa, though  Hountondj has expressed the 
view that philosophy as an academic discipline started in  
African Universities only in the 1960’s and 1970’s. 
Keywords: Epistemology, African Philosophy, 
Ethnophilosophy, Indigenous Knowledge, Culture. 
1. Two Senses of the Word Epistemology 
As it is familiar, the introduction and establishment of African 
Philosophy as part of the curriculum in Nigeria‟s higher education 
was marked or preceded by a long debate centering but not 
exclusively on its methodology and status as an academic 
discipline. As the debate continued, African philosophers and 
scholars were torn into different camps. On the one hand, there 
were some who took a skeptical position arguing that African 
philosophy was still in the making. On the other, some took a 
cultural position and were prepared to concede that African 
philosophy was continuous with African culture. 
Paulin Hountondji, one of leading African philosophers typed the 
position of the latter group as ethnophilosophical, which he takes 
to be an attempt to “define a specific African philosophy, a world-
view common to all Africans, past, present and future, a collective, 
immutable system of thought in eternal apposition to that of 
Europe”1. This way of understanding African philosophy, 
according to Hountondji, prompts some African philosophers to 
see it as a matter of duty to “reconstruct the thought of his 
forefathers, the collective Weltanschauung of his people”2. He avers 
that ethnophilosophy has as its main objective; 
…to reconstruct a particular Weltanschauung, a 
specific world-view commonly attributed to all 
Africans, abstracted from history and change and 
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moreover, philosophical through an interpretation 
of the customs and traditions, proverbs and 
institutions in short, various data-concerning the 
cultural life of African people3. 
Hountondji would not have been worried by the 
anthropologisation of African philosophy and this kind of 
scholarship if it had identified itself as a form of cultural 
anthropology,” and not, as its proponents would want us to 
believe, as representing African Philosophy and as the proper 
methodological rendering of African philosophies‟4. The 
assumption here is that philosophy cannot exist as „implicit,‟ 
„collective‟, and „communal thought,‟ which characterizes all 
Africans. Neither can philosophy be masked in the form of poems, 
myth, legends, etc, since these, according to Hountondji, are 
“artistic literature as distinct from scientific literature.”5  
Hountondji, like the members of the Analytic African philosophy, 
understands philosophy in the active sense that it is a rational and 
critical study of which argumentation and clarification are its 
essential hallmarks,” persistently “questioning the untiring 
dialectic that accidentally produces systems and then projects them 
towards a horizon of fresh truths.”6 The key points in Hountondji‟s 
denunciation of ethnophilosophy include; 
i. Orality 
ii. Myth of unanimity 
iii. Collective or communal thought as opposed to 
individual thought 
iv. Unconscious, spontaneous and implicit world-view 
v. Cultural uniqueness 
Based on his uncompromising acceptance of philosophy as defined 
or understood in a Western context, it is natural that he would 
reject as tribal world-view, terms like Igbo philosophy, Yoruba 
philosophy, Dogon philosophy, Akan philosophy etc. In the same 
manner, he would discountenance the idea of African theory of 
knowledge for the same reasons and arguments, even though 
African philosophers and scholars in and around Africa have 
sufficiently demonstrated with argumentative skills the existence of 
such philosophy and epistemology as found amongst indigenous 
African people. Perhaps, an explication of the two senses of the 
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word „epistemology‟ would dispel Hountondji‟s anxiety and 
vexation about the potentials and reality of ethnophilosophy 
and/or collective epistemology which is the concern of this essay. 
1.1 Ordinary or Broad Sense of Epistemology  
Epistemology or theory of knowledge is that branch of philosophy, 
which studies the nature of knowledge especially the question of 
how we know what we claim to know and the extent to which we 
know it.7  But epistemology is susceptible to another sense, where it 
is taken to mean the communal beliefs of a people because any 
group of human beings will certainly have to have some world 
outlook, that is, some general conceptions about the world in which 
they live and themselves both as individuals and as members of 
society.8 
Indeed in talking about traditional African philosophy, „we do not 
need to assume that there is any kind of metaphysical or mythic 
unity among Africans with respect to their conceptions of nature, 
the human, existence, society, etc. It is also not necessary to suggest 
that these conceptions are unique to them. We do not have to make 
any of these suggestions because of the diversity of the cultures 
and traditions in Africa and the possibility that these cultures and 
traditions might share some of their essential attributes with those 
of other societies. The point however, is that in spite of the 
diversity, we can still identify some deep underlying affinities 
running through the various African cultures and traditions in 
virtue of which we can establish their unity‟. The point we are 
making here is well stated by Anyanwu when he says: 
…a skeptic may doubt whether what I have 
described as the basic assumptions of African 
culture refer to all black African cultures or to 
specific or particular cultures of certain groups of 
people in Africa. I would say that it makes no 
difference whether one speaks about the philosophy 
of a particular ethnic group in Africa or the 
philosophy of African culture in general,…The 
underlying principles inherent in all African cultures 
are applicable in any form in which one may 
formulate African (traditional) philosophy9 
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Thus on the basis of this illuminating insight by an African 
philosopher, we can say that there is a certain underlying identity 
even in the face of plurality of African traditions and heritage.10 Let 
us therefore admit that there is a traditional African philosophy. 
This philosophy is certainly not a stock of metaphysical notions 
common to all Africans. Rather, it is „an abstraction standing for 
those interrelated conceptions of nature, human, society, morality 
etc. 
It is important here to distinguish between objective and subjective, 
or the material conditions that enable one or other philosophy and 
the vehicles for its expression to come into being. This point is 
taken by Joseph Dietzgen, when he writes: 
Just as the reformulation was conditioned by the 
material base of the 16th century, so the theory of 
human intellectual operations just like the discovery 
of the electric telegraph is conditioned by the 
material base of the 19th century. Accordingly the 
contents of this tract are not the product of an 
individual mind, rather they are a plant born on 
historical soil… 11 
What emerges from this would be, that there is no apparent link of 
necessity between the existence of philosophy and the effort of the 
individual since every philosophy that finds expression after, as it 
were, a period of gestation is always informed through the channel 
of one or more individuals. The vital point in a debate about the 
existence or non-existence of mode of thought cannot therefore be 
the emergence of an individual philosopher. Rather it must be what 
Dietzgen has rightly called „the material base.‟ The point here is 
that philosophy like history in general, cannot be conceived as the 
work of geniuses. For there is abundant evidence in African 
traditional thought to show that indigenous thinkers are capable of 
reflective philosophical thinking and on the basis of which we can 
say that such a world-view is characteristic of a people‟s communal 
outlook upon the universe. It would be said then that any attempt 
to reject this in preference to „the theoretical effort of the individual‟ 
is to say the least an intellectual fraud appropriating the fruits of 
the work, both manual and intellectual of the mass of the people.12 
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These scholars, especially Hountondji, who reject African 
traditional thought because according to them, it is a collective 
philosophy which is known by every Tom, Dick and Harry in the 
community failed because it ignored the relevance and impact of 
culture on the reflections of the individual thinker. Because they 
believe that philosophizing is a wholly individualistic affair, they 
also fail to realize that their so-called individual thinker must draw 
as his/her raw data the communal ideas and belief systems 
preponderant in his community. In other words, we cannot 
possibly divorce the philosophy of an individual thinker from the 
ideas current among the people, because such philosophy of the 
individual thinker is rooted in the beliefs and assumptions of the 
culture. Here, the term culture is taken from its Latin roots, cultura 
meaning cultivating or tilling the land. It was taken by Cicero and 
others as the cultivation of the soul or mind since the human spirit 
will not achieve its proper result if it is not trained or educated.13 
However, we shall define culture following E. B. Tylor, to be “that 
complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, 
customs and any other capabilities and habits acquired by the 
human as a member of society.”14 It is argued that we are justified 
in saying that Greek philosophy and British philosophy refer to the 
ideas of Socrates, Plato and Locke, Berkeley receptively simply 
because such philosophy has its roots or basis in the culture, 
traditions and mentalities of the societies of these people. 
The point being made so far is that philosophy (epistemology) is 
the product of a culture because it is inconceivable to say that a 
culture can exist without those elements of thought that are shared 
in common. Hence, we can say that all individualized philosophies 
stem from the general experience and problem confronting a 
particular people in a given cultural environment. On this 
Anyanwu says: 
The philosophies of individuals are still subordinate 
to public philosophy, and in the ultimate analysis 
public (collective) philosophy.15 
In order to corroborate the point we are canvassing here, it may be 
instructive to examine, however sketchily, some of the 
philosophical doctrines of some individual thinkers in the Western 
philosophical tradition to see how they appropriated the dominant 
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ideas of their culture to formulate their doctrines. In ancient 
philosophy both Thales, Anaximander and Anaximenes were 
credited for explaining natural phenomena in purely systematic 
and scientific terms, thereby carrying, in a manner of speaking, a 
kind of „Copernican Revolution‟ that changed the thought pattern 
of the ancients from interpreting natural phenomena in terms of 
supernatural and human agencies to doing so in scientific and non-
human agencies. It is important to note that the main pre-
occupation of these philosophers was to discover the ultimate 
principles that underlie the various things in the physical world. It 
is argued that Thales, for example, founded all things in the world 
on „water.‟ Also, it is contended that Aristotle is known for saying 
that the idea that water subsists all things in the universe was 
common in the mythological traditions of the Greeks and the 
peoples with whom they come in contact.16 The issue here is that 
the notion of water and the beliefs and practices associated with it 
were already embodied in the Greeks‟ conception of natural 
phenomena. The philosopher merely draws for his analysis the 
ideas or raw data embedded in the communal world outlook of his 
people. 
As a matter of fact, the minds of the philosophers are not like 
„tabula rasa‟ (in Locke‟s phrase) where ideas are imprinted, but are 
already furnished with the ideas, beliefs, and thoughts of their 
society. Based on this, we can argue that philosophical discussion 
in any given epoch is determined by a set of assumptions which are 
the groundwork of current conceptions shared by all men of a 
given culture.17 Thus, it can be argued that Greek philosophy or 
any other arises out of the minds of the people and is in fact a 
component part of that culture. This fact is obvious when we 
consider what Bertrand Russell says: 
My purpose is to exhibit philosophy as an integral part of social 
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1.2 Technical or Strict Sense of Epistemology 
What we attempt here is to examine epistemology in its strict or 
technical sense with a view to show that both the broad or general 
and narrow or technical sense shade into each other in many forms, 
as well as unraveling some of the pitfalls associated with the 
technical sense of the term. The word „epistemology‟ is a 
compound Greek word formed from two simple parts, „episteme‟ 
which means „knowledge‟ and „logos‟ which connotes „theory‟. 
Hence, epistemology is referred to as „theory of knowledge.‟ 
Even though epistemology embraces a variety of concepts and 
issues, its central questions that agitated the minds of philosophers 
have remained the same. These include, what are the criteria of 
knowledge? How does one know or come to know anything at all? 
And how does one know that one knows anything? These 
questions, we believe, serve as an invitation to analyze the status 
and nature of our knowledge claim; the validation of our cognitive 
experience; and the relationship between our cognitive experience 
and the various objects in the world. This is what Michael Williams 
intends when he says that epistemology is concerned with the 
nature or structure of the justification of our most important beliefs, 
our belief in the existence of the physical world.19 
Now apart from the above questions, there is even a larger question 
which is: why a theory of knowledge? that is, is it necessary to have 
a theory of knowledge? The other problems that border on the 
above questions, are the problems of what we understand by the 
term Knowledge, and what is it that deserves the title of knowledge 
.20 It is argued that the answers to these problems can be achieved 
only by those that are equipped with the techniques or 
methodology appropriate for the discovery of the truth in them. 
The same thing can be said even of a specifically knowledge claim 
made by someone on the street because it is only those who have 
the relevant facts that can make the necessary inferences and 
deductions. However, there is an exception here, that is, a 
philosopher, because of his understanding of what constitutes 
knowledge, what in general could count as knowledge, can assert 
that some particular claim purported to be a knowledge claim does 
not qualify as knowledge in the real sense of the word. The reasons 
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for the philosopher‟s discountenance of such claim could be that 
the conditions necessary for any claim  to qualify as a genuine 
claim to knowledge are not met and it is possible that the person 
making such claim simply does not have sufficient grounds for his 
claim which, in turn, may vitiate such claim from being true. The 
point then is that any claim to knowledge, if it is to be a valid claim, 
presupposes a prior satisfaction of the conditions concerning 
grounds, truth, meaning etc. Thus, the task of the philosopher, 
concerned with the theory of knowledge, is to investigate and 
elucidate, in a practical manner, the conditions and concept of 
knowledge. 
The word „know‟ is slippery, as it is complex and sometimes 
technical and philosophers have continued to grapple with its exact 
meaning. Whereas some philosophers describe the word as 
psychological or propositional attitudes towards statements or a 
state of affairs, others reject and instead claim that it has distinctive 
tone as a private mental state that intuitively distinguishes it from 
the other psychological attitudes.21 For these people, such 
statements as „I know x: will then refer to only that distinctive state 
of mind at that particular time. But its ordinary English usage tends 
to suggest that the word is commonly used in a dispositional or 
behavioral sense. On this, H. H. Price writes; 
Now in ordinary everyday English the verb „to 
know‟ generally used in a dispositional sense: not 
quite invariably perhaps, but certainly the 
dispositional use of it is by far the most common.22 
Although, we shall not wish to enter into any controversy about the 
definition of the word here, we shall simply assert that whenever 
we talk of knowledge or the ordinary English verb „to know‟ in 
epistemology,23 what we are aiming at is the sense in which a 
person knows that something is the case (knowing that or 
propositional knowledge), or the sense in which a person could be 
said to be acquainted with a state of affairs (knowledge by 
acquaintance). Such cases include, for example, the situation where 
a person claims to know that the atomic weight of gold is 197.2; or 
that A. J. Ayer is the author of The Problem of Knowledge, we believe 
that this sense of knowing entitles someone to talk of knowledge as 
being a sub-set of belief. Even, at that, the way we justify different 
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claims to knowledge differs; hence the justification of the claim that 
a person knows that the atomic weight of gold is 197.2 is quite 
different from the justification required to prove the truth of the 
claim that A.J. Ayer is the author of The Problem of Knowledge. Now 
if this is accepted, then what justification do we have to say that 
they fall under the same concept? To answer this will imply also 
our knowledge or understanding of certain similarities they share 
especially in the ordinary usage. So this seems to be one of the 
sources of the philosophical importance of trying to find an 
adequate definition of knowledge, that is, a definition that could 
provide satisfactory criteria for assessing certain claims to 
knowledge.24 
2.Interconnections between the Broad and Strict Senses of 
Epistemology 
Like we stated above, the distinction between the broad and strict 
or narrow senses of philosophy is akin to those between „critical‟ 
and „collective‟ epistemology. Hence, the explication of one can be 
used to understand the other since epistemology is a core branch of 
philosophy. Some philosophers and scholars have made 
postulations alluding to the distinction between the broad and 
strict senses of the terms, „philosophy,‟ „epistemology.‟  Witness, for 
instance, F. C. Copleston‟s distinction between broadfield and 
„second-order‟ philosophy25;  Claude Sumner‟s „broad‟ and 
„narrow‟ philosophy26; D. A. Masolo‟s „ordinary sense‟ and „second 
sense‟ philosophy27. What is clear in all these two senses of 
philosophy (epistemology) is that these philosophers do not take 
them as autonomous and as existing independently of each other. 
For them, however, both overlap and shade into each other in a 
complementary manner. 
The symbiotic relationship, as it were between the two senses or 
philosophy and/for epistemology is well expressed by Sumner 
when he argues that; 
Philosophy in a broad sense is still philosophy. „In 
this way, he justifies using the words Ethiopian 
Philosophy in the titles of his books „… He sees his 
own distinction between broad and narrow 
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philosophy to be a bridge or compromise between 
Western version of philosophy and what is needed 
to include African wisdom traditions within the field 
of philosophy, thus making the definition more 
universal rather than narrowly European28. 
Now, it was adumbrated above that Hountondji and some 
members of the analytic African philosophy movement have 
shown how traditional African thought cannot and should not 
constitute African philosophy. Hountondji, it should be recalled, in 
his seminal work, African Philosophy Myth and Reality, made a 
distinction between what he calls „popular‟ and „strict‟ senses of 
philosophy. The former, according to him, refers to “wisdom, 
individual or collective, which is made of coherent principles and 
meant to guide daily action.” However in the strict sense, 
Hountondji argues that it cannot be spontaneous or collective 
philosophy, but is based on the scientific model of free discussion 
during which hypotheses are tested29. 
Also, Kwasi Wiredu, a member of the analytic school of African 
philosophy may not be contemptuous to traditional African 
thought, as Hountondji, yet he (Wiredu) did not conceal his 
“colonized” version of philosophy that accepted Western 
definitions instead of creating African definitions of philosophy,” 
in Sumner‟s phrase30. On traditional African Philosophy, Wiredu 
has this to say; 
If African philosophy means Traditional African 
philosophy as surprisingly many people seem to 
think, then we can forget any pretence of modern 
philosophizing. In most parts of Africa, we would 
have, in that case, to abstain from such disciplines as 
symbolic logic and its philosophical interpretations, 
the philosophy of mathematics and of the natural 
and social sciences, the theory of knowledge 
associated with the foregoing disciplines and the 
moral, political and social philosophy which has 
arisen as a response to the needs of modern 
times…31 [author‟s italics] 
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According to Olusegun Oladipo, Wiredu‟s rejection of the equation 
of African Philosophy with African folk thought is informed by 
two considerations namely; „practical and theoretical‟. On the 
practical side, such equation, according to Wiredu, would amount 
to being “content with the mere narration of the ideas Africans 
lived by as an adequate fulfillment of the philosopher‟s task in 
contemporary Africa.”32 From the theoretical angle, “it would deny 
Africans the opportunity of engaging fruitfully in the activity of 
modern philosophizing.” 33 
 But the hostilities against ethnophilosophy in particular and 
traditional African philosophy in general by the analytic group is 
unwarranted because their views will definitely hurt Africa by 
robbing it, according to Barry Hallen of engagement in “a positive 
and fruitful relationship between Africa‟s indigenous intellectual 
heritage and technical systematic academic (Western) 
philosophy”.34 One aspect of their grouse (analytic group) with 
traditional African philosophy is simply that it is largely oral and 
unwritten. In other words, “its various aspects have usually been 
transmitted from generation to generation by word of mouth.”35 
However some scholars have shown that proverbs, myths, 
folklores etc, are important vehicles for the transmission of 
traditional thought and as „sources of traditional conceptions and 
ideas, whether metaphysical, epistemological, ethical etc.”36 
 By advocating the method of science and technology as the 
basis of social development by the analytic African philosophers, 
they were uncompromising in calling for a break or total 
destruction of “traditional idols” and other heritage resources. But 
it is fruitless to pursue this project because „the survival of the past 
in contemporary Africa cannot be eliminated by fiat. In the views of 
some scholars, particularly J. F. Ade-Ajayi, 
…development is not simply an activity in which the 
old is replaced by the new in a mechanical manner. 
Rather, it is a process of social reconstruction in 
which the past survives in the present, though in a 
modified form…37   
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Based on the insight offered by the doyen of African 
historiography, Ade-Ajayi, we make bold to say that the views of 
the analytical African philosophers are unilluminating and 
therefore does not serve as adequate critique of ethnophilosophy. 
The interest and my pre-occupation in this essay is to show that the 
attack on ethnophilosophy and the rejection of traditional African 
thought is misguided. This is because ethnophilosophy is still a 
fruitful discourse in contemporary Africa. Apart from promoting 
some aspects of our positive culture, also serves as a basis for 
promoting indigenous knowledge, which is “a paradigm shift from 
the mechanistic top-down models primarily concerned with 
economic development towards dynamic participatory approaches 
concerned with all facets of human development.” In other words, 
the utilization of „indigenous institutions and culture in effecting 
more positive governance and development emphasizing 
participatory processes‟ at the socio-political and economic layers 
of the society is the interest of ethnophilosophers in postcolonial 
Africa. 
Conclusion 
Let us reiterate the thrust of our argument in this essay by saying 
that it is still worthwhile to study ethnophilosophy and traditional 
African philosophy because of their potentials for assisting Africa 
to overcome some of her development challenges. 
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